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A Coordinated Withholding Tax
On Deductible Payments
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
This Shelf Project paper proposes the imposition of a
35 percent withholding tax on all deductible payments
made by a U.S. person to a nonresident, in coordination
with other OECD members. The withholding tax should
be refundable when the beneficial owner shows that the
income has been reported to the tax authorities in its
country of residence. The main purpose of this proposal
is to prevent tax evasion by U.S. residents investing from
overseas, thus helping to close the ‘‘international tax
gap.’’1
Current Law
In 1984 the United States unilaterally abolished its
withholding tax (of 30 percent) on foreign residents
earning ‘‘portfolio interest income’’ from sources within
the United States.2 Portfolio interest included interest on
U.S. government bonds, bonds issued by U.S. corpora-
tions (unless the bondholder held a 10 percent or more
stake in the shares of the corporation), and interest on
U.S. bank accounts and certificates of deposit.3 This
portfolio interest exemption is available to any nonresi-
dent alien (that is, any person who is not a U.S. resident
for tax purposes), without requiring any certification of
identity or proof that the interest income was subject to
tax in the investor’s country of residence.4
1See Guttentag and Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Closing the International
Tax Gap,’’ in Max B. Sawicky (ed.), Bridging the Tax Gap:
Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration 99 (2005).
2Section 871(h). Interest on bank deposits was exempted
earlier.
3Section 871(h)(2), (3).
4Section 871(h)(6) authorizes Treasury to suspend the appli-
cation of the exemption to prevent evasion of U.S. tax by U.S.
persons when there is no adequate exchange of information, but
that provision has never been implemented.
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Prof. Avi-Yonah proposes a 35 percent withhold-
ing tax on deductible payments made to a non-U.S.
resident, in coordination with other OECD members.
The tax is aimed at U.S. residents posing as foreign
investors and would be refundable when the benefi-
cial owner shows that the payments have been
reported to tax authorities in the owner’s country of
residence. Parts of this paper are based on Avi-
Yonah’s ‘‘Memo to Congress: It’s Time to Repeal the
U.S. Portfolio Interest Exemption,’’ Tax Notes Int’l,
Dec. 7, 1998, p. 1817, Doc 98-35627, or 98 TNI 234-26.
However, that paper was written at a time when
conditions in the U.S. economy were favorable
enough to envisage a unilateral repeal of the portfo-
lio interest exemption. No such course is advocated
under current economic conditions.
The proposal is made as a part of the Shelf Project,
a collaboration by tax professionals to develop and
perfect proposals to help Congress when it needs to
raise revenue. Shelf Project proposals are intended to
raise revenue, defend the tax base, follow the money,
and improve the rationality and efficiency of the tax
system. The tax community can propose, follow, or
edit proposals at http://www.taxshelf.org. A longer
description of the Shelf Project can be found at ‘‘The
Shelf Project: Revenue-Raising Projects That Defend
the Tax Base,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 10, 2007, p. 1077, Doc
2007-22632, or 2007 TNT 238-37.
The proposal arises as a part of the Foreign Issues
segment of the Shelf Project, which is managed by
Charles I. Kingson (University of Pennsylvania Law
School) and Prof. Avi-Yonah. The Review Committee
for the Shelf Project comprises Peter C. Canellos
(Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York), Robert
H. Dilworth (McDermott, Will & Emery, Washing-
ton), Joseph H. Guttentag (former Treasury deputy
assistant secretary for international tax affairs),
Stephen E. Shay (Ropes & Gray, Boston), and Eric M.
Zolt (UCLA Law School). Review Committee mem-
bers are not responsible for any proposals approved
by the managers with which they disagree.
Shelf Project proposals follow the format of a
congressional tax committee report in explaining
current law, what is wrong with it, and how to fix it.
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Problems With Current Law
The result of enacting the portfolio interest exemption
has been a classic race to the bottom: One after the other,
all the major economies have abolished their withholding
tax on interest for fear of losing mobile capital flows to
the United States. The table below shows current with-
holding rates in European Union member countries and
in the United States on interest paid on bank accounts
and securities (government and corporate bonds) and on
dividends paid to foreign residents in the absence of a
treaty.
As the table indicates, most developed countries im-
pose no withholding tax on interest paid to nonresidents
on bank deposits and government and corporate bonds.
Withholding taxes are imposed on dividends, even
though dividends (unlike interest) are not deductible
and, therefore, the underlying income has already been
taxed once.
The standard economic advice to small, open econo-
mies is to avoid taxing capital income at source, because
the tax will be shifted forward to the borrowers and will
result in higher domestic interest rates. However, the
countries in the table include large economies (the United
States, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in which the
tax is not necessarily shifted forward. Rather, the princi-
pal reason for the lack of withholding taxes in most of the
countries in the table above is the fear that if those taxes
were imposed, capital would swiftly move to other
locations that do not impose a withholding tax. For
example, the Ruding Committee, writing about the Eu-
ropean Community, concluded in 1992 that ‘‘recent ex-
perience suggests that any attempt by the [EU] to impose
withholding taxes on cross-border interest flows could
result in a flight of financial capital to non-EC coun-
tries.’’5
The experience of Germany is a case in point: In 1988
Germany introduced a (relatively low) 10 percent with-
holding tax on interest on bank deposits, but had to
abolish it within a few months because of the magnitude
of capital flight to Luxembourg. In 1991 the German
Federal Constitutional Court held that withholding taxes
on wages, but not on interest, violated the constitutional
right to equality, and the government therefore was
obligated to reintroduce the withholding tax on interest,
but made it inapplicable to nonresidents. Nevertheless,
nonresidents may be German residents investing through
Luxembourg bank accounts and benefiting from the
German tradition of bank secrecy vis-à-vis the govern-
ment.6
The current situation is a multiple-player prisoner’s
dilemma: All developed countries would benefit from
reintroducing the withholding tax on interest, because
they would then gain revenue without fear that the
capital would be shifted to another developed country.
However, no country is willing to be the first one to
cooperate by imposing a withholding tax unilaterally;
thus they all refrain from imposing the tax, to the
detriment of all.
In global terms, this outcome would make no differ-
ence if residence jurisdictions were able to tax their
residents on foreign-source interest (and dividend) in-
come, as required by a global personal income tax on all
income ‘‘from whatever source derived.’’ However, as
Joel Slemrod has written, ‘‘although it is not desirable to
tax capital on a source basis, it is not administratively
feasible to tax capital on a residence basis.’’7 The problem
is that residence-country fiscal authorities in general have
no means of knowing about the income that is earned by
their residents abroad. Even in the case of sophisticated
tax administrations like the IRS, tax compliance depends
decisively on the presence of either withholding at source
or information reporting. When neither is available, as in
the case of foreign-source income, compliance rates drop
dramatically.
In the case of foreign-source income, withholding
taxes are not imposed for the reasons described above. As
for information reporting, even though tax treaties con-
tain an exchange of information procedure, it is vitally
flawed in two respects: First, the lack of any uniform
worldwide system of tax identification numbers means
that most tax administrations are unable to match the
information received from their treaty partners with
domestic taxpayers. Second, there are no tax treaties with
traditional tax havens, and it is sufficient to route the
income through a tax haven to block the exchange of
information. For example, if a Mexican national invests in
a U.S. bank through a Cayman Islands corporation, the
exchange of information article in the Mexico-U.S. tax
treaty would not avail the Mexican authorities. The IRS
has no way of knowing (given bank secrecy) that the
5Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Com-
pany Taxation (Commission of the European Communities,
1992), p. 201.
6As indicated by recent press reports, because Luxembourg
is now subject to exchange of information under the savings
directive (discussed below), German capital has shifted to
Liechtenstein.
7Joel Slemrod, Comment, in Vito Tanzi, Taxation in an Inte-
grating World (1995), 144.
Country
Bank
Accounts Securities Dividends
Belgium 0 10 15
Denmark 0 0 15
France 0 0 15
Germany 0 0 15
Greece 10 10 0
Ireland 0 0 0
Italy 10 10 15
Luxembourg 0 0 15
Netherlands 0 0 15
Portugal 15 15 15
Spain 0 0 15
United Kingdom 0 0 15
United States 0 0 30
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portfolio interest that is paid to the Caymans is benefi-
cially owned by a Mexican resident covered by the
treaty.8
The resulting state of affairs is that much income from
portfolio investments overseas escapes income taxation
by either source or residence countries. Latin American
countries provide a prime example: It is estimated that
following the enactment of the portfolio interest exemp-
tion, about $300 billion fled from Latin American coun-
tries to bank accounts and other forms of portfolio
investment in the United States. Most of these funds were
channeled through tax haven corporations and therefore
were not subject to taxation in the country of residence.
For all developing countries, various estimates of the
magnitude of capital flight in the 1980s average between
$15 billion and $60 billion per year. Nor is the problem
limited to developing countries: Much of the German
portfolio interest exemption benefits German residents
who maintain bank accounts in Luxembourg, and much
of the U.S. portfolio interest exemption benefits Japanese
investors who hold U.S. treasuries and do not report the
income in Japan. Even in the case of the United States, it
is questionable how much tax is actually collected on
portfolio income earned by U.S. residents abroad other
than through mutual funds. One estimate has put capital
flight from the United States in 1980-1982 as high as $250
billion. More recently, Joseph Guttentag and I have
estimated the international tax gap (the tax owed by U.S.
residents on income earned through foreign tax havens)
at $50 billion.9
Thus, in the absence of withholding taxes or effective
information exchange, income from foreign portfolio
investments frequently escapes being taxed by any juris-
diction. This is particularly significant because the flows
of portfolio capital across international borders have been
growing recently much faster than either world gross
domestic product or foreign direct investment. It is
currently estimated that international capital flows ex-
ceed $1 trillion a day; although this figure is much larger
than income from capital, it gives a sense of the magni-
tude at stake.
This situation has led knowledgeable observers like
Richard Bird to write that ‘‘the weakness of international
taxation calls into question the viability of the income tax
itself. . . . If something is not done to rectify these prob-
lems soon, the future of the income tax is bleak.’’10 Other
authors have written papers like ‘‘Can Capital Income
Taxes Survive in Open Economies?’’ and ‘‘Is There a
Future for Capital Income Taxation?’’ Unless something
is done about this situation, the answer to those questions
is likely to be no.
A Coordinated Solution
Now may present a unique opportunity to remedy
this state of affairs because of the EU’s 2003 adoption of
a ‘‘savings directive.’’ Under the directive, the EU
adopted a ‘‘coexistence model’’ based on two options,
only one of which can be chosen by a member state:
Either to cooperate in an exchange of information pro-
gram or to levy a 20 percent withholding tax on interest
payments made by paying agents within its territory to
individual residents of another member state. Under the
exchange of information system, the member state agrees
to provide automatically, at least once a year, information
on all interest payments made by paying agents in its
territory in the preceding year to individual beneficial
owners residing in every other member state. Under the
withholding tax system, the member state agrees to
impose a 20 percent withholding tax on all interest
payments made by paying agents within its territory to
individual beneficial owners residing within the EU.
However, the withholding tax is not imposed if the
beneficial owner provides a certificate drawn up by his
country’s tax authorities attesting that they have been
informed of the interest to be received. The withholding
tax must be credited against the tax liability in the
beneficial owner’s country of residence.
The EU savings directive applies only to payments
within the EU. However, its adoption presents a golden
opportunity. As explained above, the problem of non-
taxation of cross-border interest flows stems to a large
extent from the unilateral enactment of the portfolio
interest exemption by the United States in 1984. As
observed above, the nontaxation of cross-border interest
flows is a repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Each player (the
EU, the United States, and Japan) refrains from taxing for
fear of driving investment to the others, even though
they would all benefit from imposing the tax. However, it
is well-established that these repeat prisoner’s dilemmas
can be resolved if parties can signal to each other in a
credible fashion their willingness to cooperate.
The EU directive represents just such a signal. The EU
is telling the United States that it is willing to go forward
with taxing cross-border interest flows. Thus, if the
United States were to commit itself to taxing cross-border
interest by repealing the portfolio interest exemption, the
prisoner’s dilemma could be resolved and a new, stable
equilibrium of taxing — rather than refraining from
taxing — would be established.
The prospects for agreement in this area are particu-
larly good because only a limited number of players have
to be involved. The world’s savings may be parked in tax
havens, but the cooperation of tax havens is not needed.
To earn decent returns without incurring excessive risk,
funds have to be invested in an OECD member country
(and more particularly, in the EU, the United States,
Japan, or Switzerland). Thus, if the OECD member
countries could agree to the principles adopted by the EU
in its savings directive, most of the problem of taxing
cross-border portfolio interest flows could be solved.
My proposal is therefore as follows: The United States
should move within the OECD for a coordinated imple-
mentation of the principles in the EU savings directive.
From a U.S. perspective, the main reason for doing so
would be to prevent tax evasion by U.S. residents, but
8While the United States has negotiated tax information
exchange agreements with several tax havens, not all are
covered, and restrictions in the agreements make it unlikely that
the United States will obtain the necessary information to solve
this type of problem.
9Guttentag and Avi-Yonah, supra note 1.
10Richard Bird, ‘‘Shaping a New International Tax Order,’’ 42
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 292 (1988), 303.
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cooperation with other OECD members is essential to
prevent capital from fleeing the United States. However,
while in the EU context, exchange of information could
play a large role, because there are few traditional tax
havens in the EU, in a global context withholding taxes
have to be the primary means of enforcement. As noted
above, tax havens with strong bank secrecy laws render it
very difficult to have effective exchange of information
among OECD member countries. If the investment is
made through a tax haven intermediary, exchange of
information is likely to be useless unless the tax authori-
ties in the payer’s country can know the identity of the
beneficial owner of the funds that are paid to the tax
haven intermediary.
I would therefore propose that instead of the coexist-
ence model of the EU, the United States, and with it the
OECD, should adopt a uniform withholding tax on
cross-border interest flows, which should also be ex-
tended to interest on bank deposits and to royalties and
other deductible payments on portfolio investments (for
example, all payments on derivatives).11 To approximate
the tax rate that would be levied if the payment were
taxed on a residence basis, the uniform withholding tax
rate should be high (35 percent). However, unlike the
withholding taxes that were imposed before the current
race to the bottom started in 1984, the uniform withhold-
ing tax should be completely refundable. To obtain the
refund, as in the EU directive, a beneficial owner need
only show the tax authorities in the host countries a
certificate attesting that the deductible payment was
reported to the tax authorities in the home country. No
actual proof that tax was paid on the interest income is
required: From an efficiency, equity, and revenue per-
spective, it is sufficient that the home country authority
has the opportunity to tax the income from overseas
investments in the same way as it taxes domestic-source
income. Thus, even if the home country has a generally
applicable low tax rate on its residents (or even a zero tax
rate, as long as it applies to all bona fide residents), the
resident could obtain a refund by reporting the income to
the tax authorities in his home country.
Both the proposed withholding tax and the refund
mechanism would not require a tax treaty. However, it
would be possible for countries to reduce or eliminate the
withholding tax in the treaty context when payments are
made to bona fide residents of the treaty partner. In those
cases, the exchange of information in the treaty should
suffice to ensure residence-based taxation. Because most
OECD members have tax treaties with most other OECD
members, the proposed uniform withholding tax would
in general apply only to payments made to non-OECD
member countries (including the tax havens).
Were this type of uniform withholding tax enacted by
OECD members, it would go a long way toward solving
the problem of undertaxation of cross-border portfolio
investments by individuals. This undertaxation is unac-
ceptable from an efficiency, equity, or administrability
perspective. Moreover, unlike the undertaxation of direct
investment, this type of undertaxation is illegal (which is
why it is so hard to assess its magnitude). By adopting a
uniform withholding tax, the OECD could thus strike a
major blow at tax evasion, which is a major problem for
the United States as well. In fact, from a U.S. perspective
the main benefit of the proposal would be to narrow the
international tax gap, and that can only be done in
cooperation with other OECD members.
11Payments on derivatives are generally not sourced in the
United States under reg. section 1.863-7. This rule, adopted in
1991 for similar reasons as the portfolio interest exemption, can
and should be repealed if the proposed coordinated withhold-
ing tax is implemented.
SUBMISSIONS TO TAX NOTES
Tax Notes welcomes submissions of commentary and
analysis pieces on federal tax matters that may be of
interest to the nation’s tax policymakers, academics,
and practitioners. To be considered for publication,
articles should be sent to the editor’s attention at
taxnotes@tax.org. A complete list of submission guide-
lines is available on Tax Analysts’ Web site, http://
www.taxanalysts.com/.
COMMENTARY / SHELF PROJECT
996 TAX NOTES, June 2, 2008
(C) Tax Analysts 2008. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
